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Abstract
The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending
the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We con-
sider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small
amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore-Repullo mechanisms may
not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies
as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a
wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.
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Chicago, Booth School of Business. email: richard.holden@chicagobooth.edu. We owe special thanks to
Oliver Hart for numerous discussions, and to Johannes Horner and Andy Skrzypacz for pointing out an error
in a previous version. We are also grateful to Mathias Dewatripont, Bob Gibbons, Philippe Jehiel, John
Moore, Roger Myerson, Andrew Postlewaite, Olivier Tercieux, Jean Tirole, Ivan Werning and Muhamet
Yildiz for helpful discussions and comments. Michael Powell provided excellent research assistance.
11 Introduction
Grossman and Hart (1986) argued that in contracting situations where states of nature
are observable but not veri￿able, asset ownership (or vertical integration) could help limit
the extent to which one party can be held up by the other party, which in turn should
encourage ex ante investment by the former. However, vertical integration as a solution
to the hold-up problem has been questioned in various papers1 which all use or extend
the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). In particular,
Maskin and Tirole (1999a)2 argue that although parties may have di¢ culty foreseeing future
physical contingencies they can write contracts which specify ex ante the possible payo⁄
contingencies. Once the state of the world is realized, the parties can ￿￿ll in￿the physical
details. The latter step is subject to incentive-compatibility considerations. That is, each
agent must be prepared to specify the details truthfully. Maskin and Tirole achieve this
through a 3-stage subgame perfect implementation mechanism which induces truth-telling
by all parties as the unique equilibrium outcome3.
In this paper, we consider the robustness of the Moore-Repullo (MR) mechanism to the
introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We ￿nd that the MR mechanism
may not yield even approximately truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as
the amount of informational asymmetry goes to zero. Moreover, we show that this non-
robustness result does not require informational asymmetries on agents￿types (call it the
introduction of crazy types): small deviations from symmetric information on the buyer￿ s
willingness to pay for the good or on the seller￿ s production cost, su¢ ce to generate this
non-robustness result. This, in turn, has important implications for the debate on the
foundations of incomplete contracts: namely, while asymmetric information about agents￿
types can eliminate the hold-up problem at the same time as it introduces undesirable
equilibria in sequential mechanisms, asymmetric information about valuation and costs is
1For example, see Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (1999) and recently Maskin-Tirole (1999a, 1999b).
2See also Maskin and Tirole (1999b).
3Whereas Nash implementation (see Maskin 1977, 1999) does not guarantee uniqueness.
2shown to preserve the hold-up problem even though it perturbs the MR mechanism.
We proceed in several steps. In Section 2 we introduce a simple example of ex-post
bargaining and exchange drawn from Hart and Moore (2003)4 to illustrate our ￿rst point on
the robustness of the MR mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric
information. More precisely, we modify the signal structure of the game by assuming that
each player receives private signals about the true value of the good, instead of knowing it
perfectly; thus the value is ￿almost common knowledge￿in the sense of being common p-belief
(Monderer and Samet (1989)) for p near 1. Our main ￿nding here is that the simple subgame-
perfect implementation mechanism ￿ la MR for this example, does not yield approximately
truthful revelation in either pure or totally mixed strategies as the correlation between the
private signals and the true value of the good becomes increasingly perfect, although truthful
revelation can be approximated by a partially mixed equilibrium.
The basic idea behind this result is that even a small amount of uncertainty at the
interim stage, when players have observed their signals but not yet played the game, can
loom large ex post once a player has sent a message. This is closely related to the observation
that backwards induction and related equilibrium re￿nements are not in general robust to
perturbations of the information structure (see Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988), Dekel
and Fudenberg (1990) and Borgers (1994)) so that the predictions generated under common
knowledge need not obtain under almost common knowledge. However, in this example we
restrict attention to informational asymmetries about the value of the good as opposed to
the more general perturbations considered in the robustness literature. More speci￿cally,
in our modi￿cation of the Hart-Moore-Repullo example, the Seller produces a good whose
valuation is stochastic, and may be high or low. Each contracting party gets a private and
yet almost perfect signal about the good￿ s valuation; the players have a common prior on
the joint distribution of values and signals. The Moore-Repullo mechanism requests that
one party, say the Buyer, make an announcement about the value of the good, and then the
4This example itself illustrates the mechanism in Moore and Repullo (1988, Section 5).
3Seller may either challenge or not challenge the Buyer￿ s announcement. Obviously, under
perfect information, the Buyer￿ s announcement contains no information which the Seller did
not have ex ante. However, when each player receives a private signal about the value of the
good, the Buyer￿ s announcement does contain information about her own signal of the good￿ s
valuation. The Seller will then update his belief about the value of the good, on the basis of
both, his own signal and the announcement made by the Buyer. And the resulting Bayesian
updating is what causes the subgame implementation logic to break down mechanism to
break down. For example, if the two parties commit to play the MR mechanism and yet the
Buyer announces a low value for the good, then the Seller will update his beliefs towards
the notion that the true value of the good is indeed low. Consequently, the Seller will not
challenge the Buyer by fear of being ￿ned under the MR mechanism for having unfairly
challenged the Buyer.
In Section 3 we extend our analysis to a general setting with n states of nature and trans-
ferable utility, and we show that in this setting there exist natural social choice functions
which cannot be implemented in any totally mixed equilibrium of perturbed MR mecha-
nisms with arbitrarily small amount of private information about the value of the good. In
Section 4 we move beyond Moore-Repullo mechanisms and ask whether the same logic can
apply to any extensive-form mechanism. Here we make a more general but weaker claim: for
any game induced by an extensive form-mechanism, there exists a nearby game with almost
perfect information in which at least one equilibrium is ￿undesirable￿ , i.e. does not induce
truth-telling by the contracting parties. While this conclusion can be easily established if
we allow for private signals about payo⁄s, based on Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988),
henceforth FKL5, we also prove non-robustness to the common p-belief perturbation con-
sidered in Section 2 when restricting attention to pure strategies and three-stage sequential
mechanisms.6.
5FKL show that any Nash equilibrium is the limit of strict (and thus sequential) equilibria when a small
change is made to prior beliefs. So if agents have any doubts about the payo⁄ structure, extensive-form
mechanisms cannot robustly improve on Nash implementation.
6Parallel work by Kunimoto and Tercieux (2009), who show that only Maskin-monotonic social choice
4Thus, Section 4 suggests that if we start from any subgame implementation mechanism
under perfect information, one could show the existence of at least one undesirable equi-
librium with arbitrarily small perturbations of the information structure, whereas Section
3 shows that for MR mechanisms, this perturbation leads to uniqueness of an undersir-
able equilibrium. Together these ￿ndings highlight the di¢ culties in moving beyond Nash
implementation which, in contrast to subgame perfect implementation, is robust to these
deviations from perfect information. However, most settings in contract theory involve non-
Maskin monotonic social choice functions (as in Section 2 and 3), and hence cannot be Nash
implemented.
In Section 5, we link our analysis of the non-robustness of subgame perfect implemen-
tation to the hold-up problem. In particular we argue that while the hold-up problem also
may be ￿solved￿by introducing even small amounts of private information about the agents￿
types, in contrast the hold-up problem remains when introducing small amounts of private
information about valuation and/or costs. In other words, it is the non-robustness of MR
and other extensive-form mechanisms to introducing private information about valuation or
costs which restores the Grossman-Hart logic once we allow for message games, not their
non-robustness to the introduction of ￿crazy types￿ .
In addition to the contracting and mechanism design literatures mentioned above, our
paper also relates to previous work by Cremer and McLean (1988), Johnson, Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1990), and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1991). These papers show how
one can take advantage of the correlation between agents￿signals in designing incentives to
approximate the Nash equilibrium under perfect information. These papers consider static
implementation games with commitment, and look at fairly general information structures,
as opposed to our focus on the robustness of subgame-perfect implementation to small devia-
tions from complete information. Chung and Ely (2003) show that only Maskin-monotonic
social choice functions are implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium.
functions can be implemented in the closure of the sequential equilibrium correspondence, suggests that this
result may extend to mixed strategies.
5The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our basic
idea using the simple example of Hart and Moore. We ￿rst present the implementation
result under perfect information; then we introduce (small) informational asymmetries and
illustrate our non-convergence result in that context; then we discuss the robustness of the
example. Section 3 establishes a more general non-convergence result for 3-stage Moore-
Repullo (MR) mechanisms with transferable utility, and then it discusses the non-robustness
of subgame perfect implementation through extensive-form mechanisms other than MR.
Section 4 extends the discussion to other sequential mechanisms. Finally, Section 5 analyzes
how the non-robustness of MR and other subgame perfect implementation mechanisms,
a⁄ects the debate on the foundations of Grossman-Hart (1986).
2 An example
2.1 Setup
Consider the following simple example from Hart and Moore (2003). This example captures,
in the simplest possible setting, the logic of subgame perfect implementation mechanisms.
There are two parties, a B(uyer) and a S(eller) of a single unit of an indivisible good. If
trade occurs then B￿ s payo⁄ is
VB = v ￿ p;
where p is the price. S￿ s payo⁄ is
VS = p ￿  ;
where   is the cost of producing the good, which we normalize to zero.
The good can be of either high or low quality. If it is high quality then B values it at
v = ￿ v = 14; and if it is low quality then v = v = 10:
62.2 Perfect information
Suppose ￿rst that the quality v is observable by both parties, but not veri￿able by a court.
Thus, no initial contract between the two parties can be made credibly contingent upon v:
Yet, as shown by Hart and Moore (2003), truthful revelation of v by the buyer can be
achieved through the following contract/mechanism, which includes a third party T.
1. B announces either ￿high￿or ￿low￿ . If ￿high￿then B pays S a price equal to 14 and
the game then stops.
2. If B announces ￿low￿then: (a) If S does not ￿challenge￿then B pays a price equal to
10 and the game stops.
3. If S challenges then:
(a) B pays a ￿ne F to T
(b) B is o⁄ered the good for 6
(c) If B accepts the good then S receives F from T (and also the 6 from B) and we
stop.
(d) If B rejects at 3b then S pays F to T
(e) B and S Nash bargain over the good and we stop.
When the true value of the good is common knowledge between B and S this mechanism
yields truth-telling as the unique equilibrium. To see this, let the true valuation v = ￿ v = 14;
and let F = 9: If B announces ￿high￿then B pays 14 and we stop. If, however, B announces
￿low￿then S will challenge because at stage 3a B pays 9 to T and, this being sunk, she will
still accept the good for 6 at stage 3b (since it is worth 14). S then receives 9+6 = 15, which
is greater than the 10 that she would receive if she didn￿ t challenge. Thus, if B lies, she gets
14￿9￿6 = ￿1, whereas she gets 14￿14 = 0 if she tells the truth. It is straightforward to
verify that truthtelling is also the unique equilibrium if v = v = 10: Any ￿ne greater than
8 will yield the same result.
72.3 Less than perfect information
2.3.1 Setup
Now let us introduce a small amount of noise into the setting above. Suppose that the
players have a common prior that Pr(v = 14) = Pr(v = 10) = 1=2: Each player receives an
independent draw from a signal structure with two possible signals: ￿
0 or ￿
00: Let the signal
structure be as follows:
￿
0
B￿
0
S ￿
0
B￿
00
S ￿
00
B￿
0
S ￿
00
B￿
00
S
Pr(v = 14) 1
2 (1 ￿ ")
2 1
2 (1 ￿ ")" 1
2"(1 ￿ ") 1
2"2
Pr(v = 10) 1
2"2 1
2 (1 ￿ ")" 1
2"(1 ￿ ") 1
2(1 ￿ ")2
For simplicity we will keep the payments under the mechanism the same as above and
assume that B must participate in the mechanism. We could easily adjust the payments
accordingly and assume voluntary participation.
2.3.2 Pure strategy equilibria
We ￿rst claim that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in which the buyer always reports
truthfully. By way of contradiction, suppose there is such an equilibrium, and suppose that
B gets signal ￿
0
B: Then she believes that, regardless of what signal player S gets, the value
of the good is greater than 10 in expectation. So she would like to announce ￿low￿if she
expects that subsequently to such an announcement, S will not challenge. Now, suppose B
announces low. In a fully revealing equilibrium, S will infer that B must have seen signal
￿
00
B if she announces low. S now believes that there is approximately 1=2 probability that
v = 10 and therefore she will not challenge. But if S will not challenge then B would prefer
to announce ￿low￿when she received signal ￿
0
B: Therefore there does not exist a truthfully
revealing equilibrium in pure strategies.
82.3.3 Mixed strategies and Bayesian updating
One might wonder if the truthful revelation outcome can be approximated by a mixed
equilibrium, in the way that the pure-strategy Stackelberg equilibrium can be approximated
by a mixed equilibrium of a ￿noisy commitment game￿ (van Damme and Hurkens (1997)).
We show below that this is not the case. Comparing their result with ours suggests that
the assumption of common knowledge of payo⁄s is less robust to small changes than is the
assumption of perfectly observed actions.
Speci￿cally, denote by ￿0
B; ￿0
B 2 [0;1]: the probability that B announces ￿low" after
seeing signals ￿
0
B; and let ￿00
B be the probability B announces "high" after seeing ￿
0
B , as in
the following table:
High Low
￿
0
B 1 ￿ ￿0
B ￿0
B
￿
00
B ￿00
B 1 ￿ ￿00
B
The corresponding mixing probabilities for player S are
Challenge Don￿ t Challenge
￿
0
S 1 ￿ ￿0
S ￿0
S
￿
00
S ￿00
S 1 ￿ ￿00
S
2.3.4 The result
Using the above payo⁄expressions, we will now show that the pure information equilibrium
whereby the buyer announces the valuation truthfully, does not obtain as a limit of any
equilibrium E" of the above imperfect information game as " ! 0: More speci￿cally:
Proposition 1 For any ￿ne F there is no sequence of totally mixed equilibrium strategies
￿B;￿S such that ￿0
B;￿00
B;￿0
S and ￿00
S all converge to 0 as " ! 0:
Proof. For the sake of presentation, here we prove the Proposition under the restriction
that the challenging ￿ne F is ￿xed (equal to 9 as in the above perfect information example),
however this restriction is immaterial.
9Suppose, contrary to the theorem, that as " ! 0; there is a sequence of equilibria along
which ￿0
B;￿00
B;￿0
S and ￿00
S all converge to 0 as " ! 0: Note that in this case
Consider the seller￿ s decision whether or not to challenge the buyer when ￿S = ￿
0
S and
the buyer announces ￿low￿ . Computations in the Appendix show that
VS (Cj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) = ￿(")[￿(")(￿4) + (1 ￿ ￿("))15]
+(1 ￿ ￿("))[
1
2
(￿4) +
1
2
15];
where
￿(") = Pr(￿B = ￿
0
Bj￿S = ￿
0
S;L)
=
￿
1
2(1 ￿ ")2 + 1
2"2￿
(￿0
B("))
￿
1
2(1 ￿ ")2 + 1
2"2￿
(￿0
B(")) + "(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B("))
and
￿(") = Pr(v = 10j￿
0
B;￿
0
S)
= 1 ￿
1
2(1 ￿ ")2
1
2(1 ￿ ")2 + 1
2"2:
Note that ￿(") ! 0 as " ! 0:There are two cases to consider.
Case A: ￿(") ! 0:
In this case as " ! 0 we have
VS (Cj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) !
1
2
(￿4) +
1
2
15 < VS (DCj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) = 10:
Thus S does not challenge if the buyer announces ￿low￿and ￿S = ￿
0
S:
10Now consider the case where ￿S = ￿
00
S: We have
VS (Cj￿S = ￿
00
S;L) = m(")[
1
2
(￿4) +
1
2
15]
+(1 ￿ m("))[n(")(￿4) + (1 ￿ n("))15];
where (see Appendix)
m(") = Pr(￿B = ￿
0
Bj￿S = ￿
00
S;L)
=
"(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B("))
"(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B(")) +
￿
1
2"2 + 1
2(1 ￿ ")2￿
(1 ￿ ￿00
B("))
and
n(") = Pr(v = 10j￿
0
B;￿
00
S)
= 1 ￿
1
2"2
1
2"2 + 1
2(1 ￿ ")2:
Thus m(") ! 0 and n(") ! 1 when " ! 0: Thus in the limit, challenging yields ￿4 which is
strictly less than the payo⁄(10) of not challenging. It follows that if (￿0
B;￿00
B) ! (0;0); then
necessarily (￿0
S;￿00
S) ! (1;0) in equilibrium when " ! 0; which contradicts the assumption
that ￿
0
S ! 0:
Case B: ￿(") 6! 0 and ￿0
S(") > 0 for all ":
It is possible that ￿0
B can be of order "; so that ￿ (") can be non-zero. Note that in such
a case that, as " ! 0; VS (Cj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) ! 51
2 + 91
2 ￿("):
Since VS (DCj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) = 10; if ￿
0
S > 0; it must be that
5
1
2
+ 9
1
2
￿(") = 10:
11Thus along a sequence of equilibria ￿0
B(") ! 0;￿00
B(") ! 0;￿0
S(") ! 0; ￿00
S(") ! 0; and
￿
0
S(") > 0; we know that lim"!0 ￿(") must exist and equal 9=19: Because ￿00
B ! 0; we have
￿(") =
￿
1
2(1 ￿ ")2 + 1
2"2￿
(￿0
B("))
￿
1
2(1 ￿ ")2 + 1
2"2￿
(￿0
B(")) + "(1 ￿ ")
;
so
lim
"!0￿(") = lim
"!0
￿0
B(")
￿0
B(") + 2"
and thus lim"!0 ￿(") = 9=19 requires that lim"!0￿0
B(")=" = 9=5;: so in particular ￿
0
B(") >
0. However, lim"!0VB (Hj￿B = ￿
0
B) = 0; while ￿0
S(") ! 0 implies that lim"!0 VB (Lj￿B = ￿
0
B) =
￿1; so for small "; the buyer strictly prefers to announce H; a contradiction.
To keep B to be indi⁄erent between announcing high and low given that she saw signal
￿B = ￿
0
B requires
4￿
0
S = (1 ￿ ￿
0
S);
as " ! 0; i.e. ￿0
S ! 1=5: This contradicts the supposition that ￿0
S ! 0:
2.4 Discussion of the example
It is easy to show that he uniform prior of p = 1=2 is essential for Proposition 1 when the
mechanism designer can choose any value of F (i.e. potentially greater than F = 9 as in the
example). If p > 1=2 (i.e. the good being high value has greater prior probability) then in
this example F can be chosen su¢ ciently large so as to induce the seller to challenge when
she observes the high signal but B announces ￿low￿ .
Similarly, even if p = 1=2; one could amend the example to include a di⁄erent ￿ne7 at
stage 3d than the one at stage 3a (i.e. B and S pay di⁄erent ￿nes depending on whether B
accepts the good at stage 3b). If the ￿ne B pays is su¢ cient large relative to F then the
conclusions of Proposition 1 do not hold (e.g. if B pays F = 30 if challenged and S pays
7We thank Ivan Werning for suggesting this possibility.
12F = 15 if B subsequently accepts).
We return to both of these issues when discussing the general mechanism in the next
section. As it turns out, neither asymmetric ￿nes nor large ￿nes will lead to approximately
truthful revelation with almost perfect information in the general Moore-Repullo mechanism.
As we mentioned in the introduction, this Hart-Moore-Repullo example is su¢ ciently
simple that a 2-stage mechanism in which each player acts only once can achieve approximate
e¢ ciency.
A notable feature of the example, or more precisely the statement of Proposition 1, is
that the sequence of equilibrium strategies we rule out involves ￿0
S ! 0 and ￿00
S ! 0: In
the context of the example this may, at ￿rst sight, appear rather odd: for if B announces
truthfully then S does not make a move and hence ￿0
S and ￿00
S are moot on the equilibrium
path. In the more general environment considered below, however, such considerations are
crucial.
This also relates to the fact that while there are no approximately truthful totally mixed
equilibria, it is possible to construct such an equilibrium where the low type of buyer and
seller both play pure strategies, but the high types both mix8. Again, in the general
environment this is not possible.
3 More general Moore-Repullo mechanisms
Moore and Repullo (1988) o⁄er a class of mechanisms which, with complete information,
work well in very general environments. They also outline a substantially simpler mechanism
which yields truth telling in environments where there is transferable utility. Since this is
the most hospitable environment for subgame perfect implementation, and because most
incomplete contracting settings are in economies with money, we shall focus on it.
8We are grateful to Johannes Horner and Andy Skrzypacz for pointing this out.
133.1 Setup
Let ￿ be the (￿nite) set of possible states of nature9. Let there be two agents: 1 and
2; whose preferences over a social decision d 2 D are given by !i 2 ￿i for i = 1;2: Let
￿i = f!1
i;:::;!n
i g: The agents have utility functions as follows:
u1 (d;!1) ￿ t1;
u2 (d;!2) + t2
where d is a collective decision, t1 and t2 are monetary transfers. The agent￿ s !s are common
knowledge among each other (but not ￿publicly￿known in the sense that the third party
introduced below does not know the agents !s).
Let f = (D;T1;T2) be a social choice function where for each (!1;!2) 2 ￿1￿ ￿2 the
social decision is d = D(!1;!2) and the transfers are (t1;t2) = (T1 (!1;!2);T2 (!1;!2)):
Moore and Repullo (1988) propose the following class of mechanism, which we shall refer
to as "the MR mechanism." There is one phase for each agent and each phase consists of
three stages. The game begins with phase 1, in which agent 1 announces a value !1 as we
now outline.
1. Agent 1 announces a preference !1; and we proceed to stage 2.
2. If agent 2 agrees then the phase ends and we proceed to phase 2. If agent 2 does not
agree and ￿challenges￿by announcing some ￿1 6= !1; then we proceed to stage 3.
3. Agent 1 chooses between
fd;t1g(!1) = fx;tx + ￿g
and
fd;t1g(￿1) = fy;ty + ￿g;
9Moore and Repullo (1988) allow for an in￿nite space but impose a condition bounding the utilitiy
functions which is automatically satis￿ed in the ￿nite case.
14where these functions are speci￿ed by the mechanism such that
u1 (x;!i) ￿ tx > u1 (y;!1) ￿ ty
and
u1 (x;￿1) ￿ tx < u1 (y;￿1) ￿ ty:
Also, if agent 1 chooses fx;tx + ￿g; then agent 2 receives t2 = tx ￿ ￿ (and a third
party receives 2￿): If, however, agent 1 chooses fy;ty + ￿g then agent 2 receives
t2 = ty + ￿:
Phase 2 is the same as phase 1 with the roles of players 1 and 2 reversed, i.e. agent 2
announces a !2: We use the notation stage 1.2, for example, to refer to phase 1, stage 2.
The Moore-Repullo logic is as follows. If agent 1 lied at stage 1:1 then agent 2 could chal-
lenge with the truth and then at stage 1.3 agent 1 will ￿nd it optimal to choose fy;ty + ￿g:
If ￿ is su¢ ciently large then this will be worse for agent 1 than telling the truth and having
the choice function f implemented. Moreover, agent 2 will be happy with receiving ty +￿:
If agent 1 tells the truth at stage 1:1 then agent 2 will not challenge because she knows that
agent 1 will choose fx;tx + ￿g at stage 1.3 which will cause agent 2 to pay the ￿ne of ￿:
3.2 Perturbing the information structure
We now show that this result does not hold for a small perturbation of the information
structure. Consider the following information structure. For each agent￿ s preferences there
is a separate signal structure with n signals. For agent 1￿ s preferences recall that the states
are !1
1;:::;!n
1: The n signals are ￿
1
1;:::;￿
n
1: The conditional probability of signal ￿
j
1 given
state !
j
1 given is 1 ￿ "; and the probability of each signal ￿
j
1 conditional on state k 6= j is
"=(n ￿ 1): Similarly, for agent 2￿ s preferences the states are !1
2;:::;!n
2: The n signals are
￿1
2;:::;￿n
2: The conditional probability of state !
j
2 given signal ￿
j
2 is 1￿"; and the probability
15of each state k 6= j conditional on signal ￿
j
2 is "=(n ￿ 1): The following table illustrates
this.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The timing is as follows. Nature chooses a payo⁄ parameter for each player from a
uniform distribution. Then each player simultaneously and privately observes a conditionally
independent signal from the above signal structure about player 1￿ s preferences. They then
play phase 1 of the MR mechanism to elicit player 1￿ s preferences. They then simultaneously
and privately observe a conditionally independent signal from the above signal structure
about player 2￿ s preferences. Then they play phase 2 of the MR mechanism to elicit player
2￿ s preferences10.Denote the probability that agent 1 announces ￿
j
1 conditional on seeing
signal ￿
k
1 as ￿
j
k: Similarly let the probability the agent 2 announces ￿j (at stage 2) conditional
on observing signal ￿
k
1 be ￿
j
k: In the second phase of the mechanism (designed to elicit agent
2￿ s preferences) the corresponding mixing probabilities are as follows. The probability that
agent 2 announces ￿
j
2 conditional on seeing signal ￿
k
2 is ￿
j
k and the probability the agent 1
announces ￿j (at stage 2) conditional on observing signal ￿
k
2 is ￿
j
k:
Theorem 1 Suppose that the agents￿beliefs are formed according to the above signal struc-
ture. Then there exists a social choice function f such that there is no pro￿le of totally
mixed equilibrium strategies
￿
￿
j
k;￿
j
k;￿
j
k;￿
j
k
￿
such that ￿
j
j ! 1;￿
j
j ! 1 and ￿
j
k ! 0;￿
j
k ! 0
for all k 6= j:
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 1 If the strategies are not totally mixed then there is no guarantee that any par-
ticular ￿k
‘ > 0; and hence the above expression for ￿ (") may not be well de￿ned. In other
10One could also imagine the players receiving both signals and then playing the two phases of the mech-
anism. This would complicate the analysis because it would expand the number of payo⁄ parameters for
each player.
16words, Bayes Rule o⁄ers no guide as to beliefs in this case. Consider, however, two sets of
beliefs in such circumstances: (i) that if no type of player 1 announces ^ ￿1 = ￿
k
1 then such an
announcement is considered to be truthful; or (ii) that beliefs about ^ ￿1 are uniformly distrib-
uted. In the ￿rst case Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
j
1
￿ ￿￿2 = ￿
j
2;^ ￿1 = ￿
k
1
￿
= 0 = ￿ ("): In the second ￿k
j = 1=n
for all k; and therefore lim"￿>0 ￿ = 0; which is the conclusion we obtain when Bayes Rule is
applicable.
The di¢ culty which arises under almost perfect information is that player 1 can announce
a state which is not the one ￿suggested￿by her signal and have player 2 not challenge. After
seeing the likely signal and a di⁄erent announcement from player 1, player 2 believes that
there is now only a 50:50 chance that the actual state is consistent with her signal. She
then believes that if she challenges half the time she will receive the ￿ne of ￿; but half the
time she will pay it. This eliminates the role of the ￿ne which was crucial to the mechanism
under perfect information. This in turn allows player 1 to announce whichever signal will
lead to the best social choice function for her. If her preferences are aligned with player 2￿ s
then she will announce truthfully, but if not she will not. Thus, in general, not all social
choice functions can be implemented under almost perfect information.
The Hart-Moore-Repullo buyer-seller example is a simple setting in which preferences
are clearly not aligned. There are always gains from trade, so the social decision is that
there be trade. But regardless of the quality of the good, the buyer would prefer to pay
10 for it, not 14: The seller obviously prefers to receive 14; no matter what the quality.
We suggest that such con￿ ict is common in the settings where Property Rights Theory has
proved useful, and therefore that 3-stage mechanisms may not lead to private information
being revealed.
Given the fact that the role of the ￿ne is eliminated because ￿ is received by player 2
(say) with probability 1=2 upon challenging, but also paid with probability 1=2; one natu-
rally wonders why an asymmetric ￿ne (whereby player 2 pays or receives di⁄erent amount
depending on the choice of player 1) works: In the example of section 2 this worked because
17if B announced ￿high￿then S had no right to challenge. In the general MR mechanism,
however, it is (necessarily) the case that player 2 can challenge any announcement that
player 1 makes. Consider modifying the MR mechanism so that the ￿nal part of stage 3
reads as follows: ￿ if agent 1 chooses fx;tx + ￿1g; then agent 2 receives t2 = tx ￿ ￿1: If,
however, agent 1 chooses fy;ty + ￿2g then agent 2 receives t2 = ty + ￿2:￿ Following the
same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 2, when player 1 announces something other than
￿
j
1 the payo⁄ as " ! 0 to player 2 from challenging is now
0
B
@
1
2
￿
1
n
Pn
i=i u2 (y;!i
2) + ty + ￿2
￿
+1
2
￿
1
n
Pn
i=i (u2 (x;!i
2)) + tx ￿ ￿1
￿
1
C
A:
By making ￿2 large relative to ￿1 a challenge can be encouraged. Unfortunately this may
also make player 2 challenge player 1 when she announces truthfully, as we illustrate by
example below.
3.3 An example
We now provide an example which illustrates two points: ￿rst, that asymmetric ￿nes do not
help matters, and second that there are very natural social choice functions in simple set-
tings which cannot be implemented by totally mixed equilibria in the setting with imperfect
information11. As an illustration of this suppose that D = fN;Y g; with the interpretation
that d = Y is the decision to provide a public good and d = N is not to provide it. Let
u1 = ￿1d + t1 and u2 = ￿2d + t2 with ￿i 2 f￿
L;￿
Hg for i = 1;2 with 0 = ￿
L < ￿
H: The
betas have the interpretation of being the utility derived from the public good net of its
production cost. The signal structure for each player is as follows
￿
0
1￿
0
2 ￿
0
1￿
00
2 ￿
00
1￿
0
2 ￿
00
1￿
00
2
￿
H
i
1
2 (1 ￿ ")
2 1
2 (1 ￿ ")" 1
2"(1 ￿ ") 1
2"2
￿
L
i
1
2"2 1
2 (1 ￿ ")" 1
2"(1 ￿ ") 1
2(1 ￿ ")2
11This is adapted from Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), pp.558-559.
18The social choice function we would like to implement involves d = 1 if and only if
￿1+￿2 > 0; with associated transfers such that ￿1+t1 = ￿2+t2: That is, provide the good
if and only if it has aggregate bene￿t and equate payo⁄s.
The ￿rst phase of the mechanism involves eliciting player 1￿ s preferences, ￿1: Let the
probability that agent 1 announces ￿
L conditional on seeing signal ￿
0
1 as ￿0
1 and the prob-
ability that she announces ￿
H conditional on seeing signal ￿
00
1 as ￿00
1: Let the probability
that agent 2 challenges be q: An equilibrium in which agent 1 truthful reveals and is not
challenged involves a sequence of strategies such that ￿0
1 ! 0;￿00
1 ! 0 as " ! 0: We will
again consider totally mixed strategies.
The MR mechanism for this phase involves agent 1 announcing ￿1 and then agent 2
challenging or not by announcing ^ ￿1 6= ￿1. If agent 2 does not challenge then agent 1￿ s
preference is deemed to be ￿1: If agent 2 challenges then agent 1 pays ￿1 to the third party
and then agent 1 chooses between the social choice functions
(d = N;tN ￿ ￿1;￿tN ￿ ￿1);
and
(d = Y;tY ￿ ￿1;￿tY + ￿2);
such that
tN > ￿1 + tY;
and
tN < ^ ￿1 + tY:
Again we assume that if a challenge occurs agent 1 subsequently learns her true prefer-
ence. Suppose by way of contradiction that (￿0
1;￿00
1) ! (0;0): The payo⁄ to agent 2 from
19challenging given that she observed signal ￿
0
2 is
V2
￿
Cj￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿
= Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿
[K]
+
￿
1 ￿ Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿￿
￿
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
(￿tY + ￿2)
￿
The calculation of Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿
is identical to the case considered in Proposition 1
(see section 6.1 of the appendix for these calculations) and hence lim"!0 Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿
=
0; given the supposition that (￿0
1;￿00
1) ! (0;0): This means that the value of K is immaterial.
Thus
V2
￿
Cj￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿
=
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
u2 (d = 1;￿tY + ￿2):
=
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
￿
1
2
￿
H ￿ tY + ￿2
￿
;
where the last line comes from the fact that player 2 has a 50:50 chance of being type ￿
H:
The value to agent 2 of not challenging is
V2
￿
DCj￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
L
1
￿
=
1
2
￿
￿
H ￿
￿
H
2
￿
=
1
4
￿
H:
since the social choice function speci￿es that the project be built if player 2￿ s preference is
￿2 = ￿
H given that ￿1 = ￿
L; agent 2 pays t2 = ￿
H=2: This in turn happens with probability
1=2 in a truthful equilibrium in phase 2. Thus to ensure a challenge requires
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
￿
1
2
￿
H ￿ tY + ￿2
￿
>
1
4
￿
H; (1)
When ￿2 = ￿
00
2 agent 2 will not challenge an announcement of ￿
L
1 (the calculations are
identical to those for proposition 1 in the appendix). Thus in order to have (￿0
2 ￿00
2) ! (0;0)
we require inequality (1) to hold.
20Now suppose ￿2 = ￿
0
2 and agent 1 announces ￿
H
1 : The payo⁄ to agent 2 from not
challenging is
V2
￿
DCj￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿
=
1
2
￿
￿
H ￿
￿H ￿ ￿H
2
￿
￿
1
2
￿H
2
=
1
4
￿
H:
The payo⁄ from challenging is
V2
￿
Cj￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿
= Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿
2
6 6 6 6
4
Pr
￿
￿2 = ￿
0
2j￿1 = ￿
0
1;￿
H
1 ;C
￿
(￿tN ￿ ￿1)
+Pr
￿
￿2 = ￿
00
2j￿1 = ￿
0
1;￿
H
1 ;C
￿
￿u2 (d = 1;￿tY + ￿2)
3
7 7 7 7
5
+
￿
1 ￿ Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿￿
[K
0];
where Pr
￿
￿2 = ￿
0
2j￿1 = ￿
0
1;￿
H
1 ;C
￿
is the posterior probability that agent 1 assigns to agent 2
having observed the high signal given that she (agent 1) saw the high signal and announced
truthfully but was challenged. The calculation of Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿
is identical to
the case considered in Proposition 1 (see section 5.1 of the appendix for these calculations)
and hence lim"!0 Pr
￿
￿1 = ￿
0
1j￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿
= 1; given the supposition that (￿0
1;￿00
1) ! (0;0):
This means that the value of K0 is immaterial. Note that the calculation of agent 1￿ s
posterior is identical to that in the proof of Theorem 2 and hence
lim
"!0Pr
￿
￿2 = ￿
0
2j￿1 = ￿
0
1;￿
H
1 ;C
￿
=
1
2
:
21Thus with probability 1=2 agent 1 will choose (d = N;tN ￿ ￿1;￿tN ￿ ￿1) and with proba-
bility 1=2 will choose (d = Y;tY ￿ ￿1;￿tY + ￿2)12. Thus
V2
￿
Cj￿2 = ￿
0
2;￿
H
1
￿
=
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
u2 (d = Y;￿tY + ￿2)
=
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
￿
1
2
￿
H ￿ tY + ￿2
￿
:
So to deter a false challenge requires
1
2
(￿tN ￿ ￿1) +
1
2
￿
1
2
￿
H ￿ tY + ￿2
￿
<
1
4
￿
H;
which contradicts (1).
4 More general extensive-form mechanisms
4.1 Common p-belief
We have so far restricted attention to Moore-Repullo mechanisms, and one may naturally
wonder whether a di⁄erent extensive-form mechanism could lead to truthful revelation as the
unique equilibrium outcome when allowing for (small) p-belief perturbations. As a ￿rst step
towards answering this question, in this section we consider a simple two-player-two-state
example but allow for fairly general extensive-form mechanisms.
Thus, suppose there are two players: 1 and 2, and two states of the world A and B.
The players have a common prior that each state is equally likely. Each player receives a
conditionally independent signal from the symmetric signal structure we have considered
earlier in the paper so that when " is small the true state of the world is common p-belief
for p near 1. Consider any mechanism in the following class: there are three stages, and in
12Here we assume, as in the ￿rst example, that in the event of a false challenge agent 1 learns the true
state at stage 3: Again, we could give here a 50:50 chance of making a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er with her
information at the time without altering the conclusion.
22each stage one player acts. Without loss of generality assume that each player￿ s action set is
identical to her signal. That is, she may announce A or B. Again, without loss of generality,
assume that player 1 acts at time 1, then player 2 acts at time 2, then player 1 acts again
at time 3.
Observe that truthful revelation of the state of the world ! requires one of the following:
(a) player 1 announces ! at time 1 and player 2 announces ! at time 2, or (b) player 2
announces ! at time 2 and player 1 announces ! at time 3.
Denote the messages sent by the players at times 1,2 and 3 as: m1;m2 and m3; and let
the payo⁄ to player i be vi(m1;m2;m3). For simplicity we will restrict attention to pure
strategies.
With two states of nature, equal prior pr(A) = pr(B) = 1=2 , and our assumed signal
structure, then when player 2 observes the true state, anticipates player 1 to announce
truthfully but player 1 lies at time 1, then player 2￿ s posterior belief is simply back her prior
belief 1/2.
Finally, to ￿x ideas, suppose the true state of the world is A. In the complete infor-
mation game, incentive compatibility for player 2 requires v2(B;A;A) > v2(B;B;￿); (where
v2(B;B;￿) indicates that once the two players agree the game optimally ends) and incentive
compatibility for player 1 requires v1(B;A;A) > v1(B;A;B). We will work with limiting
payo⁄s as the amount of informational asymmetry goes to zero in the imperfect information
game. If both players report truthfully, then player 2￿ s expected payo⁄ (after receiving the
signal that the state of the world is A) from announcing A after player 1 lied is
1
2
v2(B;A;A) +
1
2
v2(B;A;B) (2)
whereas her expected payo⁄ from announcing B is
1
2
v2(B;B;A) +
1
2
v2(B;B;￿): (3)
23To see this, note that when player 2 receives the signal that the state is A; but believes that
player 1 saw a signal that the state is B; her posterior is 1=2:
Incentive compatibility thus requires
1
2
v2(B;A;A) +
1
2
v2(B;A;B) >
1
2
v2(B;B;A) +
1
2
v2(B;B;￿) (4)
Since we have v2(B;A;A) > v2(B;B;￿) (from above), a necessary condition for (4) to hold
is
v2(B;A;B) > v2(B;A;A) (5)
But then if the true state of the world is B and player 1 announces truthfully, player 2 will
announce A￿ since incentive compatibility for player 1 requires v1(B;A;B) > v1(B;A;A)￿
which in turn contradicts truthful revelation. This establishes the following:
Proposition 2 Consider a three stage mechanism which implements truth-telling under per-
fect information where two players act sequentially and there are two states of nature. Then,
no common p-belief perturbation of that mechanism, with p < 1; can induce truthful revelation
in pure strategies in both states.
In parallel work, Kunimoto and Tercieux (2009) show that only Maskin-monotonic social
choice functions can be implemented in the closure of the sequential equilibrium correspon-
dence. This in turn suggests that our analysis in this section could be extended to an
arbitrary number of states of nature and to allow for mixed strategies.
4.2 Crazy types
Following Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988) (FKL), we now consider the possibility that
there might not be common knowledge of the payo⁄s at terminal nodes of the game induced
by some extensive-form mechanism- this is more general in allowing small probabilities of
e.g. the players having a preference for truthtelling or for making one false report instead of
24another. FKL essentially show that any Nash equilibrium can be ￿justi￿ed￿when players
entertain doubts about other players￿payo⁄s. Under such payo⁄ uncertainty, therefore, no
extensive-form mechanism can do better than implement Nash equilibria. The key advantage
of extensive-form mechanisms is to implement social choice functions which are not Nash
implementable, and to do so as a unique equilibrium. But, precisely because such mechanisms
rely on re￿nements of Nash equilibrium, they are not robust to introducing payo⁄uncertainty.
We illustrate this point in the context of the example of Section 2. Figure 1 depicts the
extensive form game induced by the Hart-Moore-Repullo example discussed in Section 2.
V=10 V=14
High Low
Challenge
No
Challenge
Accept Reject
(0,14)
(4,10)
(-1,15) (-2,-2)
High Low
Challenge
Reject
(-4,14)
(0,10)
(-3,15) (-4,-4)
Accept
No
Challenge
Figure 2: Hart-Moore-Repullo example
It is easy to see that when v = 14 the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the
Buyer to announce ￿High￿ , achieving a payo⁄ of 0; rather than announcing ￿Low￿ , being
challenged by the Seller, then playing ￿Accept￿and receiving a payo⁄ of ￿1: However, by
writing the game in normal form it is also easy to see that the outcome (Low, No Challenge),
while not subgame perfect, is a Nash equilibrium (the bottom right entry in the left-hand
payo⁄ matrix below. Similarly, when v = 10; B announcing 14 is a Nash equilibrium, but
not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
25v=14 C NC
14 (0;14)
￿ (0;14)
A (￿1;15) (4;10)
R (￿2;￿2) (4;10)
￿
v=10 C NC
14 (￿4;14)
￿ (￿4;14)
A (￿3;15) (0;10)
￿
R (￿4;￿4) (0;10)
Figure 3: HMR example in normal form
But then one can appeal to Proposition 3 in Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988), to
conclude that there exists a ￿nearby game￿(a general elaboration of this game) in which
(Low, No Challenge) is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium.
5 Subgame perfect implementation and the hold-up
problem
5.1 Hold-up without subgame perfect implementation but with
common p-belief
In this section, we abstract from subgame implementation mechanisms and analyze whether
the hold-up problem itself may or may not be a⁄ected by introducing small amounts of
private information. To introduce the discussion, consider ￿rst what would happen if we
allow from deviations in the sense of common p-belief, by introducing (small) amounts of
private information. Without common knowledge of payo⁄s, we know from Fudenberg,
Kreps and Levine (1988)) and our above discussion that truth-telling cannot be robustly
implemented through extensive-form mechanisms. Yet, this does not provide foundations to
Grossman and Hart (1986)￿ s analysis of the hold-up problem, simply because the hold-up
problem also disappears once we allow for such deviations. The argument is straightforward:
the hold-up problem involves a sequential game whose solution concept is a re￿nement of
Nash equilibrium. FKL show that such re￿nements are not robust to deviations from
common knowledge of payo⁄s in the following sense: all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria are
26the limit of strict (and hence sequential) equilibrium for an arbitrarily small change to prior
beliefs about payo⁄s. But the hold-up problem arises precisely because, at the investment
stage, players anticipate behavior at the (subsequent) bargaining stage. This sequential
rationality is not robust to particular deviations from common knowledge, as FKL show.
This last result is somewhat disquieting as it implies that the non-robustness of subgame
perfect implementation to deviations from common p-belief, is not so important for the
analysis of the hold-up problem: the problem itself disappears when moving from common
p-belief, for example when introducing crazy types. For instance, consider the standard
hold-up where the are two players (1 and 2) who each make an investment, and then they
bargaining sequentially over the split of the surplus. Now suppose that player 1 is, with
very small probability, a crazy type in the sense that he will never accept any o⁄er unless
the other player invested at the ￿rst-best level. When making an o⁄er player 1, even if not
the crazy type, could reject an o⁄er and player 2 will update and believe with non-negligible
probability that he is the crazy type. Anticipating this, that player 2 is better o⁄ investing
at the ￿rst-best level, rather than shading. Hence there is no hold-up problem.
However, we now argue that the hold-up problem does not disappear when introducing
small amounts of private information about the cost or value of the good. More generally,
with only common p-belief perturbations of the information structure, the hold-up problem
persists. To see this, consider the following hold-up example. Again, there is a (B)uyer and
a (S)eller of a good. The value of the good to B can be high or low (values H and L
respectively). S is endowed with one unit of the good and values it at zero. S can make
an investment, i at cost c(i); which a⁄ects the prior probability that the good will be high
value. Assume that c is increasing and convex, that c(0) = 0;c0 (0) = 0 and c(1) = 1:
After this investment is made, suppose that B and S each receive a conditionally independent
signal about v; according to the signal structure used before, i.e:
27￿
0
B￿
0
S ￿
0
B￿
00
S ￿
00
B￿
0
S ￿
00
B￿
00
S
Pr(v = H) i(1 ￿ ")
2 i(1 ￿ ")" i"(1 ￿ ") i"2
Pr(v = L) (1 ￿ i)"2 (1 ￿ i)(1 ￿ ")" (1 ￿ i)"(1 ￿ ") (1 ￿ i)(1 ￿ ")2
The timing is as follows: S chooses i; B and S simultaneously observe their signals about
v; then B and S bargaining over the transfer of the good according a bargaining protocol
where each player has a 50:50 chance of being able to make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er.
The ￿rst-best involves S solving
max
i
fiH + (1 ￿ i)L ￿ c(i)g
The ￿rst-order condition is
(H ￿ L) = c
0 ￿
i
FB￿
:
Now consider the second-best. If B gets to make the o⁄er then he clearly o⁄ers zero and
gets the good. If S gets to make the o⁄er and saw signal ￿
0; then her posterior belief about
v is
Pr(v = Hj￿B = ￿
0) =
i(1 ￿ ")
2 + i(1 ￿ ")"
i(1 ￿ ")
2 + i(1 ￿ ")" + (1 ￿ i)"2 + (1 ￿ i)(1 ￿ ")"
=
i ￿ i"
(1 ￿ 2i)" + i
:
And if she saw signal ￿
00 her posterior is
Pr(v = Hj￿B = ￿
00) =
i"(1 ￿ ") + i"2
i"(1 ￿ ") + i"2 + (1 ￿ i)"(1 ￿ ") + (1 ￿ i)(1 ￿ ")2
=
i"
1 ￿ (1 ￿ 2i)" ￿ i
:
Now consider the following equilibrium for " small but positive. If S gets the high signal
she o⁄ers a price of
i ￿ i"
(1 ￿ 2i)" + i
H; (6)
28and if she gets the low signal she o⁄ers a price of
i"
1 ￿ (1 ￿ 2i)" ￿ i
L; (7)
and B accepts price (6) if he got the high signal and price (7) if he got the low signal. S
will not want to deviate from price (7) if she gets the low signal because if she raises it to
price (6) B infers that S￿ s signal was high, but her signal was almost surely low. So for "
small B￿ s posterior belief is that v is close to (H + L)=2 and will reject the o⁄er. Obviously,
is S got the high signal she does not want to deviate to a lower price. Thus, we have an
equilibrium.
Now consider the investment stage. S￿ s expected payo⁄ is
1
2
0 +
1
2
(iH + (1 ￿ i)L) ￿ c(i):
The ￿rst-order condition for her maximization problem is therefore
1
2
(H ￿ L) = c
0 ￿
i
SB￿
:
By the convexity of c it follows that iSB < iFB; and hence the hold-up problem remains
when introducing small amounts of private information about the value of the good.
5.2 Hold-up and the HM example
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the hold-up problem may no longer be solved by
the MR mechanism once we introduce small amounts of private information about the good￿ s
valuation. To see this, let us simply introduce a stage prior to the mechanism considered in
Section 2, where the Seller has the opportunity to make an investment which increases the
probability that the good will be of high quality (i.e. that v = 14): This is in the spirit of
Che and Hausch (1999). Let S chooses investment i at cost c(i); and let the Pr(v = 14) = ￿i:
29The ￿rst-best benchmark involves maximizing total surplus from this investment. That is
max
i
f￿i14 + (1 ￿ ￿i)10 ￿ c(i)g:
The ￿rst-order condition is
4￿ = c
0 (i):
Under the mechanism considered above the Seller solves the following problem for " small
max
i
8
> <
> :
[￿i(1 ￿ Pr(Ljv = ￿ v)) + (1 ￿ ￿i)Pr(Hjv = v)]14
+[(1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ Pr(Hjv = v)) + ￿iPr(Ljv = ￿ v)]10 ￿ c(i)
9
> =
> ;
;
where Pr(Ljv = ￿ v) is the asymptotic probability that the buyer announces low when getting
signal ￿
0
B and Pr(Hjv = v) is the asymptotic probability that she announces high when
getting signal ￿
00
B as " ! 0:
Proposition 1 implies that at least one of these two probabilities remains bounded away
from zero as " ! 0: This in turn implies that the equilibrium investment under the above
revelation mechanism, de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition
4￿ (1 ￿ Pr(Ljv = ￿ v) ￿ Pr(Hjv = v)) = c
0 (i);
remains bounded away from the ￿rst-best level of investment as " ! 0:
Therefore, the Seller will not invest at the ￿rst-best level under non-integration of the
Buyer and Seller. This is precisely in accordance with the conclusion of Grossman and Hart
(1986).
306 Conclusion
Overall, our analysis provides some support for the Grossman-Hart-Moore approach to the
hold-up problem. Namely, we started from a situation with perfect information where there
is hold-up in the absence of a mechanism but the MR mechanism solves the problem; then we
pointed to arbitrarily small deviations from perfect information about the good￿ s valuation,
for which the MR mechanism fails to induce truth-telling in pure or totally mixed strategies.
We then argued that for a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms, there exist (arbitrarily
small) deviations of this mechanism which involve common p-belief and therefore preserve
the hold-up problem, and yet do not implement truth-telling as unique equilibrium in pure
strategies.
If one allows for crazy types, in the sense of FKL, then there will generally be an equi-
librium in which the hold-up problem disappears, and one where it is still present. In such
settings one might still think of a potential role for asset ownership, namely as an equilibrium
selection device and not as a device for providing incentives for speci￿c investments.
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337 Appendix: Bayesian updating and ex post payo⁄s
Note: The following calculations are for the general case of prior probability of the good being
high value of p; as opposed to 1=2:
7.1 Preliminaries
In the derivation of posterior beliefs and ex post payo⁄s, we shall make use of the fact that
B updates her beliefs about S￿ s signal according to:
Pr(￿S = ￿
0
Sj￿B = ￿
0
B) =
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2 + "(1 ￿ ")
;
Pr(￿S = ￿
00
Sj￿B = ￿
0
B) =
"(1 ￿ ")
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2 + "(1 ￿ ")
;
Pr(￿S = ￿
00
Sj￿B = ￿
00
B) =
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2 + "(1 ￿ ")
;
Pr(￿S = ￿
0
Sj￿B = ￿
00
B) =
"(1 ￿ ")
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2 + "(1 ￿ ")
;
Similarly, a type ￿
0
S seller updates her beliefs about B￿ s signal given her own signal and B￿ s
announcement, according to:
Pr(￿B = ￿
0
Bj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) =
(p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2)(￿0
B)
(p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2)(￿0
B) + "(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
Pr(￿B = ￿
00
Bj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) =
"(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
"(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B) + (p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2)(￿0
B)
:
The conditional probabilities for a type ￿
00
S seller, are:
Pr(￿B = ￿
0
Bj￿S = ￿
00
S;L) =
"(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B)
"(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B) + (p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2)(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
Pr(￿B = ￿
00
Bj￿S = ￿
00
S;L) =
(p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2)(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
(p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2)(1 ￿ ￿00
B) + "(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B)
:
347.2 Buyer￿ s ex post payo⁄s
Suppose ￿B = ￿
0
B: The value to B from announcing ￿high￿when she receives signal ￿
0
B is
VB (Hj￿B = ￿
0
B) = Pr(￿S = ￿
0
Sj￿B = ￿
0
B)
0
B
@
(E[vj￿
0
B;￿
0
S] ￿ 14)
+(E[vj￿
0
B;￿
0
S] ￿ 14)
1
C
A
+Pr(￿S = ￿
00
Sj￿B = ￿
0
B)
0
B
@
￿00
S (E[vj￿
0
B;￿
00
S] ￿ 14)
+(1 ￿ ￿00
S)(E[vj￿
0
B;￿
00
S] ￿ 14)
1
C
A
=
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2 + "(1 ￿ ")
0
B
@
￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
14
+
￿
1 ￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
10
1
C
A
+
"(1 ￿ ")
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2 + "(1 ￿ ")
(p14 + (1 ￿ p)10) ￿ 14:
The value to B from announcing ￿low￿when she receives signal ￿
0
B is
VB (Lj￿B = ￿
0
B) = Pr(￿S = ￿
0
Sj￿B = ￿
0
B)
0
B B B B
@
(1 ￿ ￿0
S)
0
B
@
Pr(v = 14j￿
0
B;￿
0
S)(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6)
+Pr(v = 10j￿
0
B;￿
0
S)(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5)
1
C
A
+￿0
S (E[vj￿
0
B;￿
0
S] ￿ 10)
1
C C C C
A
+Pr(￿S = ￿
00
Sj￿B = ￿
0
B)
0
B B B B
@
￿00
S
0
B
@
Pr(v = 14j￿
0
B;￿
00
S)(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6)
+Pr(v = 10j￿
0
B;￿
00
S)(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5)
1
C
A
+(1 ￿ ￿00
S)(E[vj￿
0
B;￿
00
S] ￿ 10)
1
C C C C
A
=
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2 + "(1 ￿ ")
0
B B B B B
B B B
@
(1 ￿ ￿0
S)
0
B
@
￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6)
+
￿
1 ￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5)
1
C
A
+￿0
S
0
B
@
￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
14
+
￿
1 ￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
10 ￿ 10
1
C
A
1
C C C C C
C C C
A
+
"(1 ￿ ")
p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2 + "(1 ￿ ")
0
B
@
￿00
S (p(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6) + (1 ￿ p)(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5))
+(1 ￿ ￿00
S)(p14 + (1 ￿ p)10 ￿ 10)
1
C
A:
35To see where the payo⁄s come from recall that if B announces ￿high￿then the mechanism
speci￿es that she gets the good for 14: If she announces low and S does not challenge she
gets the good for 10: If S does challenge then we assume that the true state of the good is
revealed to both parties and we are therefore back in the complete information setting13.
When ￿B = ￿
00
B we have
VB (Hj￿B = ￿
00
B) = Pr(￿S = ￿
0
Sj￿B = ￿
00
B)
0
B
@
E[vj￿
00
B;￿
0
S] ￿ 14
+E[vj￿
00
B;￿
0
S] ￿ 14
1
C
A
+Pr(￿S = ￿
00
Sj￿B = ￿
00
B)
0
B
@
E[vj￿
00
B;￿
00
S] ￿ 14
+E[vj￿
00
B;￿
00
S] ￿ 14
1
C
A
=
"(1 ￿ ")
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2 + "(1 ￿ ")
(p14 + (1 ￿ p)10)
+
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2 + "(1 ￿ ")
(p14 + (1 ￿ p)10) ￿ 14;
and
VB (Lj￿B = ￿
00
B) = Pr(￿S = ￿
0
Sj￿B = ￿
00
B)
0
B B B B
@
(1 ￿ ￿0
S)
0
B
@
Pr(v = 14j￿
00
B;￿
0
S)(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6)
+Pr(v = 10j￿
00
B;￿
0
S)(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5)
1
C
A
+￿0
SE[vj￿
00
B;￿
0
S] ￿ 10
1
C C C C
A
+Pr(￿S = ￿
00
Sj￿B = ￿
00
B)
0
B B B B
@
￿00
S
0
B
@
Pr(v = 14j￿
00
B;￿
00
S)(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6)
+Pr(v = 10j￿
00
B;￿
00
S)(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5)
1
C
A
+(1 ￿ ￿00
S)E[vj￿
00
B;￿
00
S] ￿ 10
1
C C C
C
A
13This could be modi￿ed so that at the bargaining stage￿ in the spirit of Myerson (1984)￿ each player has
a 50% chance of making a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er, using the information she has at that time. If B gets to
make the o⁄er she always o⁄ers zero, and if S gets to make the o⁄er she o⁄ers a price equal to the posterior
expectation of the value of the good conditional on her signal ￿S:
36=
"(1 ￿ ")
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2 + "(1 ￿ ")
0
B
@
(1 ￿ ￿0
S)(p(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6) + (1 ￿ p)(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5))
+￿0
S (p14 + (1 ￿ p)10) ￿ 10
1
C
A
+
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2
p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2 + "(1 ￿ ")
0
B B B B B
B B B
@
￿00
S
0
B
@
￿
p"2
p"2+(1￿p)(1￿")2
￿
(14 ￿ 9 ￿ 6)
+
￿
1 ￿
p"2
p"2+(1￿p)(1￿")2
￿
(10 ￿ 9 ￿ 5
1
C
A
+(1 ￿ ￿00
S)
0
B
@
￿
p"2
p"2+(1￿p)(1￿")2
￿
14
+
￿
1 ￿
p"2
p"2+(1￿p)(1￿")2
￿
1
C
A10
1
C C C C C
C C C
A
:
7.3 Seller￿ s ex post payo⁄s
The payo⁄ to player S conditional on ￿S = ￿
0
S and B announcing ￿high￿is
VS (￿S = ￿
0
S;H) = VS (￿S = ￿
00
S;H) = 14:
since the mechanism speci￿es that B gets the good for 14 when she announces ￿high￿ .
In the equilibria that we consider in the text, the buyer is either exactly or approximately
truthful, so there is positive probability that the buyer announces ￿low￿ , and we can thus
compute conditional payo⁄s on this event using Bayes rule.
The payo⁄for player S conditional on challenging when ￿S = ￿
0
S and B announcing ￿low￿
is
VS (Cj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) = Pr(￿B = ￿
0
Bj￿S = ￿
0
S;L)
0
B
@
0
B
@
Pr(v = 10j￿
0
B;￿
0
S)(5 ￿ 9)
+Pr(v = 14j￿
0
B;￿
0
S)(9 + 6)
1
C
A
1
C
A
+Pr(￿B = ￿
00
Bj￿S = ￿
0
S;L)
0
B
@
0
B
@
Pr(v = 10j￿
00
B;￿
0
S)(5 ￿ 9)
+Pr(v = 14j￿
00
B;￿
0
S)(9 + 6)
1
C
A
1
C
A
=
(p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2)(￿0
B)
(p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2)(￿0
B) + "(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
0
B
@
0
B
@
￿
1 ￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
(5 ￿ 9)
+
￿
p(1￿")2
p(1￿")2+(1￿p)"2
￿
(9 + 6)
1
C
A
1
C
A
+
"(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
"(1 ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿00
B) + (p(1 ￿ ")2 + (1 ￿ p)"2)(￿0
B)
(((1 ￿ p)(5 ￿ 9) + p(9 + 6))):
37The payo⁄ for player S conditional on not challenging when ￿S = ￿
0
S and B announcing
￿low￿is
VS (DCj￿S = ￿
0
S;L) = 10
The payo⁄ for player S conditional on challenging when ￿S = ￿
00
S and B announces ￿low￿
is
VS (Cj￿S = ￿
00
S;L) = Pr(￿B = ￿
0
Bj￿S = ￿
00
S;L)
0
B
@
0
B
@
Pr(v = 10j￿
0
B;￿
00
S)(5 ￿ 9)
+Pr(v = 14j￿
0
B;￿
00
S)(9 + 6)
1
C
A
1
C
A
+Pr(￿B = ￿
00
Bj￿S = ￿
00
S;L)
0
B
@
0
B
@
Pr(v = 10j￿
00
B;￿
00
S)(5 ￿ 9)
+Pr(v = 14j￿
00
B;￿
00
S)(9 + 6)
1
C
A
1
C
A
=
"(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B)
"(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B) + (p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2)(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
(((1 ￿ p)(5 ￿ 9) + p(9 + 6)))
+
(p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2)(1 ￿ ￿00
B)
(p"2 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ")2)(1 ￿ ￿00
B) + "(1 ￿ ")(￿0
B)
0
B
@
0
B
@
￿
1 ￿
p"2
p"2+(1￿p)(1￿")2
￿
(5 ￿ 9)
+
￿
p"2
p"2+(1￿p)(1￿")2
￿
(9 + 6)
1
C
A
1
C
A:
The payo⁄for player S conditional on not challenging when ￿S = ￿
00
S and B announces ￿low￿
is
VS (DCj￿S = ￿
00
S;L) = 10
7.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that as " ! 0; we have ￿
j
j ! 1 and ￿
j
j ! 1: Now
consider player 2￿ s decision whether or not to challenge at stage 1.2, when player 1 announces
something other than ￿
j
1: By Bayes Rule, player 2￿ s posterior belief that player 1 saw signal
￿
j
1 given that player 2 saw signal ￿
j
1 and that player 1 announced something other than ￿
j
1 is
38￿ (") ￿ Pr
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:
Also, let
￿k (") = Pr
￿
!1 = !
k
1j￿1 = ￿
j
1;￿2 = ￿
j
2
￿
; for k 6= j
= 1 ￿
(1 ￿ ")
2
(1 ￿ ")
2 + (n ￿ 1) "2
(n￿1)2
:
Finally let ￿(") =
P
k6=j ￿k ("): Note that if player 1 indeed saw signal ￿
j
1 then at stage
1.3 with probability 1 ￿ ￿(") she will choose fy;ty + ￿g and with probability ￿(") she will
choose fx;tx + ￿g: Under the former choice player 2 receives a transfer of ty +￿ and under
the latter choice she receives a transfer of tx ￿ ￿:
39The payo⁄ to player 2 from challenging is therefore
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￿
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Note that as " ! 0; ￿(") ! 1; and that given the supposition that ￿
j
j ! 1 as " ! 0 we
have ￿ (") ! 0 as " ! 0; unless ￿k
j is of the order of ": If it is then for a mixed strategy
equilibrium to exist requires ￿
j
j and ￿
j
k such that player 1 is indi⁄erent between announcing
truthfully and not. This requires ￿
j
j 6= 1; which is a contradiction. For if ￿
j
j = 1 (i.e. player
2 announces truthfully) then player 1￿ s preference is accepted, but then player 1 plainly
cannot be indi⁄erent for all social choice functions f = (D;T1;T2):
We thus return to the case where ￿ (") ! 0 as " ! 0; and note that
Pr
￿
!1 = !
z
1j￿1 = ￿
z
1;￿2 = ￿
j
2
￿
=
Pr
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￿
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z
1;￿2 = ￿
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1
￿
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1)
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z
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j
2
￿
=
1
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1
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￿
2(1 ￿ ") "
n￿1 + (n ￿ 2)
￿
"
n￿1
￿2￿
=
1 ￿ "
2(1 ￿ ") + n￿2
n￿1"
;
where the third equality holds by conditional independence of ￿1 and ￿2; and the fourth
40equality is derived as follows.
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n ￿ 1
+
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￿
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=
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so that
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Therefore the payo⁄ as " ! 0 to player 2 from challenging is
0
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￿
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￿
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Note that the ￿s cancel out which means we can no longer conclude that player 2 will be
willing to challenge for all social choice functions f: That is, there exists an f such that the
payo⁄ from challenging is smaller than the payo⁄ from not challenging, that being
1
n
n X
i=1
￿
u2
￿
D
￿
^ !1;!
i
2
￿
;!
i
2
￿
+ t2
￿
:
Thus, player 2 will not necessarily challenge if she sees signal ￿
j
2 and player 1 announces
!k
1;k 6= j:
Now consider other signals that player 2 could observe. Note that by the construction
41of the signal structure
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j
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k
2;^ ￿1 = ￿
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￿
;k 6= j =
1
n ￿ 1
Pr
￿
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j
1j￿2 6= ￿
j
2; ^ !1 = !
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￿
;
which goes to zero as " ! 0: Applying the same reasoning as above player 2 will not
challenge in this case either.
Now let us consider player 1￿ s choice when ￿1 = ￿
j
1: Given that player 2 will not challenge
when " ! 0; we have for " su¢ ciently small that the payo⁄ to announcing ^ ￿1 = ￿
j
1 is
V
j
1 =
1
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n X
i=1
u1
￿
D
￿
!
j
1;!
i
2
￿
;!
i
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￿
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j
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:
The payo⁄ to announcing some other state ^ ￿1 = ￿
k
1;k 6= j is
V
k
1 =
1
n
 
n X
i=i
u1
￿
D
￿
!
k
1;!
i
2
￿
;!
i
2
￿
￿ t
k
1
!
:
But there clearly exist social choice functions f = (D;T1;T2) such that V k
1 > V
j
1 ; and without
further restrictions on preferences we cannot rule out that these social choice functions also
lead player 2 not to challenge at stage 1:2:
Identical reasoning establishes a contradiction for ￿
j
j ! 1 and ￿
j
k ! 0 for all k 6= j in
phase 2 of the mechanism where the players￿roles are reversed.
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